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I. INTRODUCTION
In the long run we will all be dead, thus accounting for a com-
mon proclivity to focus on the short run. We must, however, guard
against the tendency to view present conditions as eternal. So long as
we live in a dual sovereignty consisting of federal and state govern-
ments, the tension between state and federal power can never be re-
solved in any definitive manner. At best, some sort of temporary bal-
ance must be struck, and the demarcation line of that balance swings
to and fro like a pendulum. One purpose in adopting the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights was to put in place a system whereby their
meaning would be embodied in the shifting outcome of the continuing
struggle between various decision makers.
Although this symposium appropriately focuses on current condi-
tions, it behooves us to remember the words of the 81-year-old Ben-
jamin Franklin when urging the adoption of our Constitution:
I confess that there are several parts of this constitution which I do not at
present approve, but I am not sure I shall never approve them: For having
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lived long, I have experienced many instances of being obliged, by better
information or fuller consideration, to change opinions even on important
subjects, which I once thought right, but found to be otherwise . . . '
Following Franklin's example, this essay takes a protracted view
of the federalization of criminal procedure. It is important to review
how the federalism pendulum has swung over the years to reflect con-
cepts of what the Constitution was meant to mean, what it has come to
mean, and what it ought to mean.
II. IN THE BEGINNING
Federalism is identifying the rules of the game under which the
process of decision-making and exercise of government power will
proceed. By adopting a constitution and a bill of rights, a political
community defines its boundaries and establishes the system from
which legitimate outcomes derive. It is not surprising then that the
debate over ratification of the Bill of Rights focused on "what kind of
government Americans wanted, not what rights this government should
protect. '
In the beginning were the states, whose constitutions provided the
model for the federal Bill of Rights. "[T]he drafters of the federal Bill
of Rights drew upon corresponding provisions in the various state
constitutions,"'3 and James Madison undertook a comprehensive com-
parison of the provisions of state constitutions with those of the federal
Constitution.' A federal Bill of Rights patterned on state provisions
was the mandatory price federalists paid to gain support from anti-
federalists who Feared the potential tyranny of a strong central govern-
ment.
1. Sol Wachtler, Our Constitutions - Alive and Well, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 381,
381 n.2 (1987) [hereinafter Wachtler] (quoting 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FED-
ERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 641-43 (1966)).
2. Maeva Marcus, The Adoption of the Bill of Rights, I WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J.
115, 117 (1992) (addressing the plenary session at the Conference for the Federal Judiciary
in Honor of the Bicentennial of the Bill of Rights (Oct. 21, 1991)).
3. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 501 (1977).
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 323 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
[Vol. 98:771
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In light of their perceived oppression at the hands of the English
monarchy, anti-federalists and many other Americans in the 1780s
associated a strong central government with tyranny and a strong state
government with freedom. Individual freedom could be protected not
only by the local legislature, but by the local courts as well. Although
twentieth century lawyers rush to constitutionalize and codify criminal
procedure, antebellum lawyers did not start their analysis with the
Constitution or latest Supreme Court decision.5 The grand tradition in
the states was common law decision-making: reasoning by analogy
from established precedent. The Constitution, Declaration of Indepen-
dence, Magna Carta, the English Bill of Rights, and similar manifestos
of human rights could be seen as merely declaratory of rights already
in existence and subject to protection by common law.6 In short, the
framers saw no need to extend the Bill of Rights to the states because
the states were seen as protectors of, rather than threats to, individual
rights. Such at least was the conventional wisdom which led Chief
Justice Marshall to declare that the Bill of Rights "is intended solely as
a limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the United
States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the states."7
In the beginning and for the first one hundred years of the
nation's existence, the federalism pendulum was motionless, serving as
a fixed demarcation line dividing two separate spheres within which
each government regulated its criminal justice system independently of
the other. The Bill of Rights limited the powers of the federal gov-
ernment, while individual state constitutions regulated the use of state
power. The Fourteenth Amendment would end this equilibrium and set
the pendulum in motion.
5. It was not until the 1960s that the Supreme Court forged "a national human rights
law and new legal framework for society, with the federal Constitution and the Supreme
Court at its center." Judith S. Kaye, Forward: The Common Law and State Constitutional
Law as Full Partners in the Protection of Individual Rights, 23 RUTGERS L. J. 727, 736
(1992).
6. Id. See also H. JEFFERSON POwELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 117 (1993) (explaining that constitutionalism was a tradition of common
law reasoning rather than of political theorizing).
7. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833).
1996]
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III. DUE PROCESS AND INCORPORATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
The institution of slavery demonstrated that the states could not be
trusted to safeguard the liberty of all citizens. Slavery and the repres-
sion that it bred was almost exclusively a creature of state law. Efforts
to preserve slavery
led slave states to violate virtually every "right" and "freedom" declared in
the Bill - not just rights and freedoms of slaves, but of free men and
women too. Simply put, slavery required repression. Speech and writing
critical of slavery - even if plainly religious or political in inspiration -
was incendiary and had to be suppressed in Southern states, lest slaves
overhear and get ideas.'
In the aftermath of the Civil War the former confederate states
could not be trusted to respect individual rights of the newly freed
slaves. When state government was seen as a threat to, not as a protec-
tor of individual rights, the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted as a
powerful brake on runaway state government. The Amendment mandat-
ed that no state may "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."9
With the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment the Supreme
Court embarked upon the "incorporation" debate over a number of
integrated questions. Does the Fourteenth Amendment incorporate the
Bill of Rights, making the Bill's restrictions on federal power applica-
ble against the states? Are only some of the provisions of the first ten
amendments incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment? Is the Four-
teenth Amendment's concept of due process independent of the Bill of
Rights and thus a "blank check" to be filled in by the judiciary?" In
the area of criminal procedure the Supreme Court would not confront
these issues until the early twentieth century and would not resolve
many of the questions until the heyday of the Warren Court.
8. Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J.
1193, 1216 (1992) (citations omitted).
9. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
10. Due process is "the least frozen concept of our law - the least confined to histo-
ry and the most absorptive of powerful social standards of a progressive society." Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
[Vol. 98:771
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In the decade preceding the Warren Court, Justice Frankfurter was
the leading proponent of the view that "[tihe Fourteenth Amendment
did not mean to imprison the States into the limited experience of the
eighteenth century,"'" thus the amendment incorporated none of the
specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. Instead, "the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment expresses a demand for civilized
standards which are not defined by the specifically enumerated guaran-
tees of the Bill of Rights ...due process of law has its own indepen-
dent function." 2 In two dramatic cases, Justice Frankfurter instructed
the Court as to how to identify the civilized standards embodied within
due process.
In Louisiana ex r.el. Francis,3 Frankfurter provided the crucial
vote and authored a concurring opinion for an otherwise equally divid-
ed Court. The defendant in Francis had been placed in the electric
chair and the executioner threw the switch, but because of some me-
chanical difficulty, death did not result. 4 The defendant was removed
from the electric chair, returned to prison and rescheduled for execu-
tion. 5 The defendant then claimed that a second attempt at execution
would violate the Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopar-
dy and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.'
6
Four Justices assumed, but did not decide, that the Fifth and
Eighth Amendments were incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause and thereby made applicable to
Louisiana. 7 Nonetheless, these Justices found no constitutional viola-
tion because the state did not intend to be cruel, nor did the state plan
to torture Francis. 8 The Justices lamented the unfortunate circum-
stances of the case, but suggested that "[a]ccidents happen for which
11. Louisiana ex reL. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 468 (1947).
12. Id.
13. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
14. Id. at 460.
15. Id. at 461.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 462-64.
18. Francis, 329 U.S. at 464.
1996]
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no man is to blame."' 9 The four dissenters, however, insisted that
"[tihe intent of the executioner cannot lessen the torture or excuse the
result,""0 and that this "death by installments" was cruel and unusual
punishment.2
Frankfurter expressed his "personal feeling of revulsion against a
State's insistence on its pound of flesh," and conceded that he was
"[s]trongly drawn" to some of the sentiments expressed by the dis-
sent.2 He felt compelled, however, to put aside personal feelings be-
cause "great tolerance toward a State's conduct is demanded of this
Court." 3 For Frankfurter, the Due Process Clause entitled the Court
to rein in a state acting "in a manner that violates standards of decency
more or less universally accepted though not when it treats him by a
mode about which opinion is fairly divided." 4 Presumably, a four to
four vote by the other members of the Court was a paradigm of fair
division, thus causing Frankfurter to defer to the state's judgment.
Five years after the Francis decision, however, Frankfurter would
find a clear violation of due process even though Justice Douglas in-
formed him that opinion on the matter was not fairly divided, in fact
the vast majority of the states approved what Frankfurter now con-
demned. In Rochin v. California25 the police illegally forced their way
into Rochin's bedroom where they saw him seize two capsules from a
night stand and put them in his mouth. Three officers "jumped upon
him" and unsuccessfully attempted to extract the capsules. 6 Rochin
was handcuffed and taken to a hospital where a doctor forced an emet-
ic solution through a tube into Rochin's stomach. This "stomach
pumping" produced vomiting, and two capsules containing morphine
were found in the vomited matter.2"
19. Id. at 462.
20. Id. at 477 (Burton, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 472-81 (Burton, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 471 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
23. Francis, 329 U.S. at 470 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 469-70 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
25. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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Frankfurter again paid homage to judicial restraint and the Court's
duty to 'exercise with due humility our merely negative function in
subjecting convictions from state courts to the very narrow scrutiny
which the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment authoriz-
es.' ' 29 That narrow scrutiny required the Court to give the states free
rein so long as convictions were not "brought about by methods that
offend 'a sense of justice.""'3 In an eloquent passage, Frankfurter ex-
plained why the state had violated standards of fundamental justice:
[T]he proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than
offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about com-
batting crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience.
Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open
his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his
stomach's contents - this course of proceeding by agents of government
to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are
methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional
differentiation.3
In Frankfurter's talented hands due process was flexible enough to
sanction "execution by installments" while condemning the rudeness
with which the police forced a defendant to vomit. The Warren Court
would both disdain Frankfurter's approach and utilize it in slightly
different form.
IV. THE WARREN COURT
Frankfurter had swung the federalism pendulum toward the posi-
tion that the Due Process Clause incorporated none of the specific
provisions of the Bill of Rights. Instead, each particular case had to be
examined to determine whether the right alleged is one implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty. Frankfurter's chief antagonist on the Court
was Justice Black, who sought to swing the pendulum from no incor-
poration to total incorporation of the Bill of Rights. In Rochin, Black
argued that the Fifth Amendment was applicable to the states and that
29. Id. at 168 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 412, 418 (1945)).
30. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173.
31. Id. at 172.
1996]
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California had violated the Amendment by forcibly taking incriminating
evidence from the defendant." Black derided Frankfurter's "nebulous
standards" of civilized justice as a chancellor's foot veto over law en-
forcement practices of which the Court did not approve.3 Black main-
tained that total incorporation provided the content of due process and
more importantly "keeps judges from roaming at will in their own
notions of what policies outside the Bill of Rights are desirable and
what are not."34
Had either Black's total incorporation or Frankfurter's no incorpo-
ration approach been adopted by the full Court, that aspect of the fed-
eralism pendulum would have been frozen in place. The Court, howev-
er, ultimately adopted a process of selective incorporation,35 thereby
insuring some elbow room for future movement should the pendulum
need to be adjusted to accommodate additional rights found to be em-
bodied in due process.
Although the incorporation debate was a major focus of the War-
ren Court, it is not the defining characteristic of the Court's approach
to the federalization of criminal procedure. In the long run, the concept
of total, selective, or no incorporation, proved to be little more than
different verbal formulae used to achieve the same results. Because
most language in the Bill of Rights is as general and nebulous as is
the phrase "due process," dwelling on the literal language of the Bill
of Rights simply shifts the focus of broad judicial inquiry from "due
process" to such equally general terms as "unreasonable searches."
Consider Schmerber v. California6 where the state extracted a
blood sample from an unconscious defendant suspected of drunk driv-
ing. The Supreme Court ruled: (1) extraction of the blood did not
offend that sense of justice spoken of in Rochin;37 (2) the privilege
32. Id. at 174-77 (Black, J., concurring).
33. Id.
34. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
35. The Court picks and chooses those rights it considers "'of the very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty."' William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The
Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535,
538 (1986) [hereinafter Brennan] (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937)).
36. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
37. Id. at 771.
[Vol. 98:771
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against self-incrimination, now binding on the states, only protected
"evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature," which the blood
sample was not;38 and (3) the protection against unreasonable search
and seizure, also now binding on the states, was satisfied because the
procedures used to take the blood were constitutionally "reasonable.
39
In Schmerber, testing the state's exercise of power under the Fourth,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments produced the same result.4"
At the other end of the spectrum, Winston v. Lee4 demonstrated
that substantive due process retains some vitality. In Winston, the po-
lice sought a court order requiring a robbery suspect to undergo sur-
gery for removal of a bullet lodged in his shoulder, in hopes that a
ballistics test would link the bullet to the victim's gun.42 The defen-
dant maintained that compulsory surgery would violate his Fourth
Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures.43
The Supreme Court conceded that by seeking a court order based on
probable cause, the state had complied with the procedural require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment.44 This determination might have dis-
posed of the case in light of the Court's earlier suggestions that no
area of individual privacy was beyond the reach of a procedurally
proper warrant.45 Nonetheless, the Court barred state ordered surgery
because it would violate the Fourth Amendment's substantive require-
ment of reasonableness; a requirement unrelated to the amendment's
procedural requirements. 6 The effect of Winston was that although all
of the procedures of the Fourth Amendment warrant clause might be
satisfied, a search could still be invalidated because of the substantive
right of privacy embodied in the amendment's reasonableness clause.47
38. Id. at 761.
39. Id. at 771.
40. See also United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 736 (1980) (holding that the
relevant interests do not change when a court analyzes police misconduct under the Fourth
Amendment, Due Process Clause, or the court's supervisory power).
41. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
42. Id. at 756.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 763.
45. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
46. Winston, 470 U.S. at 767.
47. See Ronald J. Bacigal, Dodging a Bullet, But Opening Old Wounds in Fourth
1996]
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Winston's protection of substantive privacy rights under the Fourth
Amendment's rubric of reasonableness sounds very much like substan-
tive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, much of
the language in Winston echoes the due process language of Rochin.48
Like Justice Frankfurter, Justice Brennan indicated that the state had
shocked the Court's collective conscience:
[T]he Commonwealth proposes to take control of respondent's body, to
"drug this citizen - not yet convicted of a criminal offense - with nar-
cotics and barbiturates into a state of unconsciousness,".. and then to
search beneath his skin for evidence of a crime."9
Due process and similarly sweeping concepts of unreasonable
searches and seizures have proved to be equally facile tools for assess-
ing the constitutional propriety of state law enforcement practices. Thus
the great incorporation debate has ended (or limps along) with a mere
whimper. In the long run, the most significant feature of the Warren
Court was not the controversy over whether to employ no, total, or
selective incorporation as the tool for reviewing state law enforcement
practices. The defiming characteristic of the Warren Court was its will-
ingness to push the federalism pendulum to increase federal review of
the previously neglected area of pretrial police procedures.
In the 1950s and '60s the Warren Court faced a serious discrepan-
cy between legal theory and the reality of modern law enforcement.
On paper, the Bill of Rights and state constitutions enumerated the
individual's protections against government power, but "at night on the
streets, and in the darker comers of station-houses, lawlessness was
more of a reality than constitutional delicacy."5 ° The "third-degree"
and other questionable police tactics (if not actual police brutality)
increasingly came to the Court's attention. Professor Kamisar graphical-
Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 SETON HALL L. REv. 597 (1986).
48. The lower court in Winston concluded that the proposed surgery was "condemned
by Rochin." Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 900 (4th Cir. 1983).
49. Winston, 470 U.S. at 765 (quoting Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 901 (4th Cir.
1983) (citations omitted)).
50. Lawrence M. Friedman, State Constitutions and Criminal Justice in the Late Nine-
teenth Century, 53 ALB. L. REv. 265, 275 (1989) [hereinafter Friedman].
[Vol. 98:771
10
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 98, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol98/iss3/6
FEDERALISM PEND UL UM
ly portrayed the courtroom as the showcase "mansion" of criminal pro-
cedure while the police station was a lowly "gatehouse":
The courtroom is a splendid place where defense attorneys bellow
and strut and prosecuting attorneys are hemmed in at many turns. But
what happens before an accused reaches the safety and enjoys the comfort
of this veritable mansion? Ah, there's the rub. Typically he must first pass
through a much less pretentious edifice, a police station with bare back
rooms and locked doors.
In this "gatehouse" of American criminal procedure . . . the enemy
of the state is a depersonalized "subject" to be "sized up" and subjected to
"interrogation tactics and techniques most appropriate for the occasion;" he
is "game" to be stalked and cornered. Here, ideals are checked at the
door, "realities" faced, and the prestige of law enforcement vindicated."
Professor Kamisar queried "why the Constitution requires so much
in the courtroom and means so little in the police station.""2 The
Warren Court would answer that query by examining entrenched police
practices and subjecting them to constitutional scrutiny.
At the heart of the Warren Court's approach to criminal procedure
was the belief that the states could not be trusted to protect the rights
of criminal defendants. 3 This belief was triggered by a shift in popu-
lar perceptions about government power. 4 In the eighteenth century,
fear of an overbearing and oppressive government was a pervasive
influence on the original Bill of Rights, but by the twentieth century
fear of tyranny was replaced by fear of the criminal.55 In response to
this widespread fear the police and the state courts adopted a "get
tough on crime" stance as the criminal justice system increasingly
focused on ways to control and eliminate crime, rather than on ways to
51. Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Crimi-
nal Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, From Escobedo to .... in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
OUR TiME 3, 19-20 (1965).
52. Id. at 21.
53. In the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright, Justice Harlan expressed dissatisfac-
tion with many state courts' discharge of their "front-line responsibility for the enforcement
of constitutional rights." Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963) (Harlan, J., con-
curring).
54. The 0. J. Simpson trial in general, and the detective Fuhrman tapes in particular,
may alter the public perception of controlling police power.
55. Friedman, supra note 50, at 272.
1996]
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protect the accused. The Warren Court would buck popular consensus
by swinging the federalism pendulum in favor of extending federal
constitutional protections to those suspected of criminal activity. Mapp
v. Ohio,56 which extended the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to
the states, and Miranda v. Arizona,17 which required the now famous
warnings, must rank among the most unpopular decisions in Supreme
Court history.
In the present day it has become fashionable to characterize the
Warren Court's constitutionalization of criminal procedure as an un-
democratic exercise of judicial arrogance. Democratic theory, however,
presumes shifting coalitions where minorities may come together and
become majorities or at least substantial minorities who can gain the
ear of the legislature. In practice, criminal defendants find themselves
permanently in a minority status before the legislature and feared by
the majority of law abiding citizens. Majoritarian decision-making may
be generally a good thing, but sometimes it needs correction by the
courts, particularly when there are reasons to think that some minority
voices have been unable to be heard fairly. The judicial activism of the
Warren Court has been defended on grounds that the oppressed can at
least get into court to argue against their oppression, unlike the diffi-
culties encountered when attempting to mount an effective political
movement that would similarly argue against their oppression.58
In the long run, however, the Warren Court's legal or political
justifications for its activism are less significant than its efforts to in-
ject humane principles into criminal procedure.5" The Court's humani-
tarian approach to criminal procedure is best captured in folklore re-
counting oral arguments before the Warren Court. In a typical case,
government counsel might defend a police practice by invoking lofty
jurisprudential arguments, often involving federalism issues. An impa-
tient Chief Justice would interrupt: "Yes, yes. But is it fair?"6 That
56. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
57. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
58. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
59. "But the Constitution is 'intended to preserve practical and substantial rights, not
to maintain theories."' Rochin, 342 U.S. at 174 (quoting Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457
(1904)).
60. Justice Brennan referred to the Warren era as "a time in which the Court played
[Vol. 98:771
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 98, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol98/iss3/6
FEDERALISMPENDULUM
pithy question embodies all that was good and bad about the Warren
Court's activism. Less brusque but no less revealing was Chief Justice
Warren's retirement address where he noted that minorities sometimes
could look to no one but the judiciary." He explained that, "we have
no constituency. We serve no majority. We serve no minority. We
serve only the public interest as we see it, guided only by the Consti-
tution and our own consciences."'6 Though one wonders if the words
stuck in his throat, President Nixon appeared at the retirement ceremo-
ny and praised Warren's fairness and his humanity." As an expression
of humanity and fairness, the Warren Court pushed the federalism
pendulum to extend federal constitutional protection of individual
rights.
V. THE BURGER AND REHNQUIST COURTS
Whether one criticizes or defends the Warren Court's activist bent,
the federalism pendulum has once again swung, and the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts have engineered a retreat from federal supervision of
"fundamental fairness." In United States v. Payner,64 the lower court
held that "the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
inherent supervisory power of the federal courts required it to exclude
evidence tainted by the Government's 'knowing and purposeful bad
faith hostility to any person's fundamental constitutional rights."'6
The Supreme Court quickly disposed of this remnant of Frankfurter's
approach to due process. The Court stated that even if government
'the role of keeper of the nation's conscience."' Brennan, supra note 35, at 547 (citations
omitted). The Warren Court reflected a twentieth century phenomenon, an "unspoken norm
that large power-centers (governmental or otherwise) should act fairly, insofar as they make
major impacts on people's lives." Friedman, supra note 50, at 274.
61. Retirement of Mr. Chief Justice Warren, 395 U.S. vii, xi (1969).
62. Id.
63. Id. at viii. President Nixon employed a Will Rogers quote to describe Chief Jus-
tice Warren - "It is great to be great. It is greater to be human." Id.
64. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
65. Id. at 731 (quoting United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 129 (1977)). The
District Court found that "'the Government affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth
Amendment standing limitation permits them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional
search and seizure of one individual in order to obtain evidence against third parties ... "
Id. at 730 (quoting Payner, 434 F. Supp. at 132-33).
1996]
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conduct is so outrageous as to offend fundamental "canons of decency
and fairness" according to Rochin, "the fact remains that '[t]he limita-
tions of the Due Process Clause . . . come into play only when the
Government activity in question violates some protected right of the
defendant.""' In the absence of a specific violation of the particular
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, the overall propriety of the
government's search and seizure activity was no longer subject to re-
view under the Due Process Clause.
In addition to discounting the majestic generalities of Due Process,
the Burger Court resurrected faith in the states as protectors of indi-
vidual freedom. Stone v. Powell67 rejected any argument that the War-
ren Court's expansion of federal power had been justified by the state
courts' hostility to the Bill of Rights:
Despite differences in institutional environment and the unsympathetic
attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state judges in years past,
we are unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appro-
priate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of
the several States. . . . In sum, there is "no intrinsic reason why the fact
that a man is a federal judge should make him more competent, or consci-
entious, or learned with respect to the [consideration of Fourth Amend-
ment claims] than his neighbor in the state courthouse."'"
Stone v. Powell announced that henceforth federal habeas corpus
would not be used to review Fourth Amendment claims so long as the
"State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation" of the
claim.69 The Court's retreat from habeas review was based on its de-
cision to "forgo the exercise" of this power in the interest of "comity
and concerns for the orderly administration of criminal justice"7 and
to diminish "federal-state friction."'" The dissent, however, turned the
tables on the majority by characterizing the holding as "a manifestation
66. Id. at 737 n.9 (quoting Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169; Hampton v. United States, 425
U.S. 484, 490 (1976)).
67. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
68. Id. at 494 n.35 (quoting Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. REv. 441, 509 (1963)).
69. Id. at 494.
70. Id. at 478 n.ll.
71. Id. at 523 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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of this Court's mistrust for federal judges" who might too actively set
aside state court determinations.7"
Stone v. Powell was merely the first step in the Supreme Court's
generally successful efforts to rein in federal judges reared on the War-
ren Court's judicial activism and distrust of state courts. In a dramatic
turnabout from the perception of the Warren Court as the bulwark
standing between citizens and state governmental incursions on their
liberties, there has been an emerging perception that state courts are a
more hospitable forum than are their federal counterparts for those who
seek expanded protection of human rights and civil liberties. Today, it
is the state courts that are expressing dissatisfaction with the Supreme
Court's role in the enforcement of constitutional rights.
Unlike other critics of the Supreme Court, state courts have the
power to do something about their discontent with the current status of
human rights litigation. As coequal guardians of civil rights and liber-
ties, state courts are free to surpass the minimum guarantees embodied
in the federal Bill of Rights. Although the Fourteenth Amendment does
not permit a state to fall below a common national standard, above this
level, federalism permits diversity. Michigan v. Long73 recognized that
if a state court plainly declares that its increased protection of individu-
al rights rests on state law, the U. S. Supreme Court will honor that
statement and will not review the state court decision.
To its critics, the Warren Court engineered a permanent redistribu-
tion of power from the states to the federal government, thereby sti-
fling federalism's invitation to states to "serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments."'74 But a pendulum does not
allow for "permanent" shifts. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts have
dismantled the Warren Court's federalization of the criminal justice
system and once again shifted power back to the states. Michigan v.
Long marks the path for states to escape federal review and remain the
72. Powell, 428 U.S. at 530 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
74. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1931) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
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ultimate arbiters of state law. In the short run, the state laboratories are
once again open for business.
Under the new federalism the political forces within each state
laboratory are free to wield their influence upon the state judiciary. As
Chief Justice Burger suggested, "when state courts interpret state law to
require more than the Federal Constitution requires, the citizens of the
state must be aware that they have the power to amend state law to
insure rational law enforcement."75 With each new state court deci-
sion, "liberals" presumably will rise to defend or attack the decision,
while "conservatives" will respond accordingly. Because of popular
election or retention elections by the legislature, most state court judges
are subject to greater political accountability than are their federal
counterparts. Should state judges prove to be unresponsive to political
pressures, expressions of the popular will can take the form of consti-
tutional amendment, a much less cumbersome process at the state level.
There is, however, another side to the new federalism which per-
mits state judges to insulate themselves from almost all accountability.
If so disposed, a state court could base its decision on both indepen-
dent state grounds and upon federal grounds, thereby using each sover-
eign to trump the other. That is, by invoking the state constitution the
state court insulates its decision from federal judicial review. By simul-
taneously invoking the federal constitution the state court blocks ac-
countability to the state political system. This form of unreviewable
judicial power is an anathema to the proponents of the new federalism,
but the jury is still out on whether the Supreme Court will permit state
judges to manipulate federalism concepts to remove themselves from
accountability to both federal and state authorities.
It is too early in the game to make a long run assessment of the
latest shift in federal/state power or to measure the true colors of the
new federalism espoused by the Supreme Court. Should the Court lose
patience with the results from the state laboratories, the door to experi-
mentation could slam shut. Scarcely twelve years passed between the
Court's encouragement of federalism and diversity in Wolf v. Colora-
do76, and Mapp v. Ohio"' when the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
75. Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 639 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
76. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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rule was imposed on the states. Only time will tell whether the federal-
ism pendulum will continue in its present direction toward increased
state power, or whether the inevitable rebound is near at hand. The
federalization of criminal procedure is governed by changes in society
and by shifting political winds. Those winds will surely shift again;
only the timing is in question.
VI. CONCLUSION
This essay began with a promise to take a protracted view of the
federalization of criminal procedure. What we gain from a broadened
perspective is an appreciation of federalism as an ongoing process
rather than a substantive result that we may or may not favor. Those
who focus on process can delight in the federalism debate as a means
of continually participating in a modern-day constitutional convention
redefming the structure and relationship of our federal and state gov-
ernments.78
Those who favor results over process may hope to see the federal-
ism debate come to a conclusion after some two hundred years. (Even
the 0. J. Simpson trial finally ended). It might be comforting to re-
solve this debate if we could believe that the federalism pendulum had
stopped swinging because it found the exactly correct balancing point
between federal and state power. However, even assuming that there is
some exactly correct balancing point,
we make a serious mistake to accept the belief that the past has done its
work for the present, and that our liberty, which is the cornerstone of
democracy, is guaranteed. The truth is that one generation can never pro-
tect the rights of another, and although all of our great documents: the
Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights, are
ideal reflections of our finest aspirations, they are not self-fulfilling chari-
ots of justice. For all their beauty, they are only words, dependent on each
77. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
78. The debate between modem-day Federalists and Anti-federalists is increasingly
strident. Both sides need to remember that federal and state governments "not only peaceful-
ly co-exist, but depend on each other, in varying degrees, to do their work. The essence of
the relationship is interdependence." Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate
Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REv. 707, 709 (1983).
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generation to give them a meaning and content for its own time and
place.79
In the long run we will all be dead, but the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights will be given new life by those who follow us and who
must continue to fine tune the mechanism that controls the federalism
pendulum.
79. Wachtler, supra note 1, at 387 (citations omitted).
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